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The Finch Effect: Evolutionary Metaphors
and Illiberal Democracy in Central and
Eastern Europe
Abigail Woodfield
Brigham Young University
Abstract
In recent years, several states in Central and Eastern Europe have seen democratic
digression. Such illiberal resurgences came as a surprise to the many political scientists who
assumed that the future of these states was democratic. Indeed, after the fall of the Soviet
Union, the world largely regarded liberal democracy as the predominant system of government. The future seemed bright, and it was tempting to understand that future in evolutionary terms—just as humans evolved under natural selection to become the dominant species,
democracy had survived a similar competition and defeated all other systems of government
to become the dominant regime. Yet, if liberal democracy had really beaten the competition back in 1989, why do self-described illiberal democracies stubbornly persist today? To
provide a different evolutionary approach, this paper tries to understand illiberal democracy
in Central and Eastern Europe as the differential result of the 2008 financial crisis, rather
than as the uniform result of deep historical trends.
Keywords
illiberal democracy, evolution, populism, financial crisis
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“There has been a temptation to assume that the conceptions of biology can be transferred to the facts of society without the need of a critical investigation of their validity
in this new sphere… It is so very easy to say Evolution instead of saying History
and to use a few Darwinian phrases as keys to unlock all mysteries”
David Ritchie, Darwinism and Politics 1891
“The state that emerges at the end of history is liberal”
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History? 1989
1.

Introduction
In recent years, several countries in Central and Eastern Europe have digressed
in an undemocratic manner. Such illiberal resurgences came as a surprise to many who assumed that that future was democratic. Indeed, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the world
largely regarded liberal democracy as the predominant system of government. The opinion
wasn’t that all governments were necessarily democratic, only that they ought to be. Such
a notion provided the European Union with a reason for enlargement; the EU ushered
in the likes of Poland, Czechia, Hungary, and other previously undemocratic nations into
the democratic community (Börzel, 2017). They did so under the assumption that these
countries would one day become consolidated democracies, and the West had no reason to
believe that this wouldn’t be the case. Although some challenged these perceptions (Jowitt,
1992), for most, the future seemed bright. Much evidence suggested that Fukuyama was
correct—the fight for freedom and democracy had ended and with it, so had history.
It was tempting to understand this democratic victory in terms of evolution—just
as humans evolved under natural selection to become the dominant species, democracy had
survived a similar competition and defeated all other systems of government to become the
dominant regime. Yet we are currently observing an illiberal resurgence in the very countries the EU presumed to be heading in a liberal direction. In Hungry and Poland, leaders
have restricted free speech and radically embraced nationalism. Additionally, countries like
the Czech Republic and Slovakia are fostering anti-EU sentiments, and authoritarianism is
on the rise. If liberal democracy had really beaten the competition back in 1989, why do
self-described illiberal democracies stubbornly persist today? This is a complex puzzle with
many possible explanations, but the best answer comes from an analysis of evolutionary
metaphors, particularly from a biological perspective that finds democracy to be a result of
these metaphorical processes.
2.

Extending and Refining Previous Theory
Evolution requires a change in the heritable characteristics of populations over
successive generations. While it is most famous as a biological phenomenon, it is also a valuable approach to politics. Many other works (Eichengreen, 2018; Levitsky & Way, 2002;
Corning, 2008; Krastev, 2012) have used evolution to explain political patterns, including
the emergence of political regimes. While these are important works that seek to understand many aspects of democracy across the world, I extend and refine one such important
paper—Modelski and Thompson (1999)—to help describe the rise of illiberal democracy
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in the aftermath of EU enlargement. According to
Modelski and Thompson (1999), history is marked by changes and power struggles, which
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2019/iss1/11
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make it an inherently evolutionary process. They use evolution in a broad sense to denote
development. In this respect, they single out four basic evolutionary mechanisms that, over
time, result in large scale changes to the global political community. These are: agenda setting,
coalition building, macrodecisions, and execution.
These terms require some brief definition: agenda setting is defined as important
events and issues that require action on a worldwide scale, not merely regional. Coalition
building is the process by which a political system is created to address those events. Macrodecisions are the large-scale responses that flow from processes of both agenda setting and coalition building. These usually take the form of war or other conflicts. Execution is the resulting
global authority or major power (Modelski and Thompson, 1999, p. 125). Modelski and
Thompson use this framework to propose an evolutionary cycle of history as seen in the top
rows of Table 1:
Table 1: Modelski and Thompson Model

The table illustrates general evolutionary trends that lead Modelski and Thompson
(1999), in the final row, to make predictions about the future. These predictions operate on
a baseline assumption that globalism and democratic integration will promote democratic
peace and lead the macrodecision mechanism to evolve away from war and physical conflict
into solutions based on negotiation (p. 132). In light of this, the authors state that, “the EU
is likely to become the focus of a democratic and stable zone that is no longer a source of
major conflagrations” and, most importantly, that liberal democracy will flourish and grow
in many corners of the world (p. 131-138). Thus, the relatively casual and often implicit
form of evolutionary theory made famous by Fukuyama has a counterpart in a more sophisticated and long-run approach to evolution––an approach that also saw the future of liberal
democracy as very bright.
As Karl Popper noted in 1961, however, “it is impossible to predict the future
course of history.” With hindsight, we might now revise Table 1 in the following way:
Table 2: Reformulated Modelski and Thompson Model

To fill in Modelski and Thompson’s evolutionary model, illiberal resurgence might be a
natural choice for the current macrodecision. However, democratic integration as a coalition
building mechanism fails to explain that pattern. While a divergence from war as a macroThe Finch Effect
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decision may still be credible, the conjecture on the dominance of liberal democracy now
appears to be incorrect. After all, polity scores suggest democracy has declined globally for
twelve consecutive years (Freedom House, 2017).
In this respect, Modelski and Thompson’s argument is remarkably similar to Fukuyama’s. The former takes a far more complex evolutionary approach based on historical
trends, but both come to the conclusion that liberal democracy is the natural political ‘winner.’ Although Modelski and Thompson’s model for change provides an important basis
for an evolutionary approach to politics, it requires extension and refinement. Following
Ritchie, this paper shares a concern noted in the epigraph about the use of “a few Darwinian phrases as keys to unlock all mysteries” (Ritchie, 1891, p. 119). To provide a different
evolutionary approach, this paper tries to understand illiberal democracy in Central and
Eastern Europe as the differential result of economic shocks of 2008, rather than as the uniform
result of deep historical trends.
3.

Political Evolution in Terms of Biology
Foremost, we must correct a misconception: rather than evolution dictating a single
genetic victor, it produces variation across species. In Darwin’s 1835 voyage to the Galapagos Islands, he noticed systematic variation among finch beak sizes based upon their
location. Birds lacking a certain polymorphism—physical characteristics that allow for the
survival of a species due to a set of changing environmental factors—were selected out of
the environment. Darwin determined that a single finch did not dominate over all others,
but that finches vary according to selective pressures.
Evolution is a result of these selective pressures and respective polymorphisms.
In biology, selective pressures are defined as environmental conditions that place strain on
the organisms in a given setting. Polymorphisms are the physical characteristics that certain
animals possess or acquire that allow them to thrive in the environment despite, or because
of a set of selective pressures. In this sense, natural selection becomes the process by which
a particular species with a given set of polymorphism survives whereas those without it die.
Considering the Finch example, we can refine these terms in ways that also apply to illiberal
democracy.
Suppose that on a certain island in the Galapagos archipelago there are two types of
finches; one eats only tree nuts, and the other eats only berries. The finch that eats tree nuts
has a large beak, which allows it to crack the shells of the tree nuts they consume, whereas
the second finch has a small beak suited for only soft berries. However, due to climate
change, berries cease to grow on the island and the only food source left for the finches are
tree nuts. As a result, birds with small beaks starve and eventually die out, whereas birds with
large beaks continue to thrive and survive. Climate change and the loss of berries as a food
source would be considered a selective pressure because it placed environmental strain on
the finches. The beak sizes would be considered polymorphisms because they are physical
characteristics that allowed for the survival (or not) of a certain finch. Based on the location
of the island, the type of finches that survive may differ. This provides the basis for variation
and is explained in the diagram below:

https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2019/iss1/11

Claremont–UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union

137

Figure 1: The Evolution of Finches on the Galapagos Islands

I use an analogous process to understand change in Central and Eastern Europe. It
is possible that like Darwin’s finches, certain selective pressures have forced countries in that
region to either allow their democracy to evolve or risk extinction. Extinction in this case
might refer the collapse of institutions and the reformation of a new state. As Ritchie puts
it, “social variation arises from external influences” (Ritchie, 1891, p. 130). These external
influences are selective pressures that place stress on regimes. Like climate change, events
like the 2008 economic crisis change the political environment and force organisms, or in
this case democracies, to evolve. These selective pressures are comparable to what Modelski
and Thompson call “agenda setting mechanisms” in the sense that they force the global
order to change. However, approaching them in this different and biological sense is valuable because it allows us to consider characteristics or polymorphisms as a function of these
pressures or shocks and not as results of history alone.
Political polymorphisms, then, are the characteristics that allow democracy to survive under such external conditions. Like a finch’s beak, they are the features and assets a
country has that allow them to avoid metaphorical extinction. Political success in this case is
the consolidation of a regime and its ability to avoid institutional collapse as in the cases of
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, and even perhaps in the future, Ukraine. Various polymorphisms give a higher chance of regime survival but may result in ‘evolved’ democracies that
scholars legitimately deem ‘illiberal.’ Examples of such polymorphisms may include populism, limitations of free speech, harsh immigration laws, and even decreasing democratic
commitment.
The latter is especially significant. While countries are experiencing an illiberal resurgence as a result of selective pressures and polymorphisms like populism, it is also possible
that they are more predisposed to such a political order than countries that are classically
liberal. Returning to the analogy of Darwin’s finches, even though the birds with different
The Finch Effect
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beaks may be members of the same species, they are innately and genetically different. It
might be beneficial to think of this in terms of the well-known children’s story: The Ugly
Duckling. In the story, a mother duck cares for all the eggs in her nest in the hopes that
they will one day hatch into healthy ducklings. However, unbeknownst to her, one of the
eggs is not like the others. This fact is largely undetectable to the duck until the eggs begin
to hatch. At this point it is clear that the ugly duckling was different all along. Just as in the
story, though the duckling was considered ugly by those who were unlike it, it surely would
have been appreciated by those who were similar. Though deemed ugly, the reality is that
it was merely different.
This analogy is useful to describe the type of variation we see for democracies in
Europe. The EU, like the mother duck, patiently nurtured countries in Central and Eastern
Europe in the hopes that they might one day grow to be liberal. Yet, like the ugly duckling,
now that they have hatched, countries like Poland, Hungary, and even the Czech Republic, are revealing themselves to be composed of an entirely different genetic code. The very
things that allow a democracy to survive certain shocks or pressures are often what force
them to change in an illiberal manner.
I argue that these countries are manifested variations of democracy specific to location as a result of selective pressures and adaptive political polymorphisms that may result
from inherent ‘genetic’ differences that stem from culture and even history, though neither
on its own. These are difficult variables to measure, and as such this paper will not fully explore the ways in which they might influence illiberalism. Regardless, Fukuyama and other
democratic theorists like Modelski and Thompson operate under the supposition of evolution as a result of ‘survival of the fittest’ evolutionary trends. But as George Ritchie points
out, “The phrase ‘survival of the fittest’ is very apt to mislead for it suggests the fittest or best
in every sense, whereas in reality it only means the survival of those best fitted to cope with
their circumstances” (Ritchie, 1891, p. 12). As such, liberal democracy does not mark the
“end of history” and is not a resulting global authority, but merely a variation of democracy
as a result of certain selective pressures and polymorphisms.
4.

The Research Question
A number of recent scholars have described the mysterious illiberal changes in democracy in Central and Eastern Europe as an indication of democratic backsliding. Nancy
Bermeo describes this trend as a breakdown of liberal democracies (Bermeo, 2016). As this
point suggests, previous arguments paint the situation as black and white. Similarly, Bermeo, Fukuyama, and in some cases Modelski and Thompson rationalize democracy in these
terms––either regimes are democratic, or they are not, and if they are not then they have
failed or are in the process of doing so. Using evolution as a model for democracy in Central
and Eastern Europe offers a different perspective.
When the Czech Republic joined the EU in 2004, it seemed obvious that the
country was on a liberal course. Indeed, Czechia became the poster child for EU enlargement and the spread of liberal democracy. This is not so true anymore. Instead, the very
features that make a democracy liberal are coming into question. The same can be said of
Hungary. In the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, Hungary passed what is called
the “turnover test.” This proverbial evaluation indicates that democracies are stable as a
result of the repeated transfer of power from party to party. However, as Viktor Orban retains sovereign authority, this trend is arguably diminishing. As a result, in both the Czech
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2019/iss1/11
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Republic and Hungary, we observe rising democracy scores. Freedom House uses an ordinal scale from 1 to 7 (1=Most Democratic, 7=Least Democratic) to measure democracy in
almost every country. For the past 10 years, the Czech Republic has floated around a 3.00
with a marked increase in 2009 around the time that Mirek Topolanek was appointed as
Prime Minister. Comparatively, Hungary increased from a 2.25 in 2008 to a 4.25 in 2017
(Freedom House, 2017). These are puzzling changes that Foa and Mounk might call signs
of deconsolidation (Foa & Mounk, 1992).
For this reason, these two countries are ideal case studies that help demonstrate the
validity of a different approach to politics from an evolutionary perspective. The increase in
democracy scores of Czechia and Hungary largely occurred after the financial crisis of 2008.
This makes it an excellent example of a selective pressure that clearly placed extreme strain
on both countries. In this respect, I pose the following research question:
What are the various metaphorical polymorphisms that have contributed to the
resurgence of illiberal democracy in both in the Czech Republic and Hungary as a
result of the pressures introduced by the 2008 financial crisis?
This question is politically significant. Essentially, if this comparative case study
yields promising results, it could help form the basis of a new understanding for illiberal
democracies everywhere. This approach may have the capacity to set precedence for future
questions regarding different countries, selective pressures, and polymorphisms. This model
has the potential to be applied anywhere in the world. Selective pressures and consequent
polymorphisms exist not only in the democracies of Hungary and the Czech Republic, but
also in Brazil, Venezuela, and even the United States.
In all cases, evolution applied to politics could help to explain the reasons behind
why certain regimes persist in certain places, under certain circumstances. In this sense, it
can help produce a political pattern that veritably measures democracy as the result of evolution. Whether we like it or not, illiberal democracies persist. As such, it is vital we begun to
understand the patterns and puzzles that characterize these regimes.
5.

Measurement
The 2008 financial crisis had an undeniably global impact. At the time, scholars
argued that Hungary was the hardest hit country in the EU due to post-Soviet debts, foreign
currency loans, and its exclusion from the Eurozone (Darvas, 2008). In reality, they were
one of the countries in Europe to recover the fastest from the crisis. The same could be said
of the Czech Republic. Both currently have unemployment rates below 4%, and yet both
have become increasingly illiberal. Could these two things be correlated?
Since the 2008 financial crisis, Europe has seen an increase in populism and a noticeable decrease in commitment to democracy, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe.
For this reason, they are ideal candidates for metaphorical polymorphisms that have contributed to the resurgence of illiberal democracy in both the Czech Republic and Hungary. I
define my variables as:
Independent Variables
Commitment to Democracy
Populism
The Finch Effect
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Dependent Variable
Degree of Illiberal Democracy
How does one measure populism or commitment to democracy? Kirk Hawkins
uses survey-based data to rank countries on an incremental populist scale. His data is founded
on both the analysis of written government documents and speeches given by various government leaders (Hawkins et al., 2012). According to an article published by The Guardian,
“[e]ach leader was given an average populism score, based on the extent to which speeches
contained populist ideas. The data pinpoints populist discourse by leaders in all the largest
countries in Europe and the Americas, as well as India. Researchers graded their speeches
on a 0-2 scale, ranging from not populist to very populist” (Lewis et al., 2019). This type
of system for measuring populism has proved to be very effective. It works well within an
evolutionary model because it singles out elected leaders as examples of populism. If populism is a characteristic of democracy that has arisen as a result of the 2008 financial crisis, it
is possible to assume that a state has become more illiberal in the process of “evolutionary”
survival or extinction.
Commitment to democracy is similar in that it is a characteristic predictive of illiberalism and arises in times of external pressures like the 2008 financial crisis. However,
like the ugly (or at least different) duckling, it may also be an innate characteristic of each
country. In both cases it tends to produce illiberal democracy. Various opinion polls have
sampled citizens in Hungary and the Czech Republic in order to measure commitments
to democracy in those countries. Using these polls, we will be able to understand how this
variable has influenced stability and illiberalism in these countries after the 2008 financial
crisis.
Some might say that these two measures are the same, that illiberalism by default
suggests that a country will be less committed to democracy or have a propensity towards
populism. There are several reasons why these assumptions, though understandable, do not
apply. First, academic literature makes the argument that liberal democracy naturally results
in populism. Consolidated democracies also experience populist movements that threaten
many tenets of liberalism and yet, as in the case of the United States, democratic institutions
do not collapse, and rights do not disappear. Furthermore, countries that are far from democracy, like China and North Korea, do not experience populism in the same threatening
way that many liberal democracies do. In essence, populism can lead to illiberal democracy,
but rarely does illiberal democracy lead to populism.
Second, not all countries with low levels of democratic commitment experience
illiberal shifts. Citizens of countries can lack democratic commitment, yet the democratic
institutions themselves remain in place; a country does not become illiberal only if its people
are. However, low institutional commitment to democracy may be synonymous with illiberal democracy. In this case, the government itself ceases to act in a democratic manner
and the institutions either evolve or collapse. This is the dependent variable, whereas the
factors that contribute to this result are the independent variables which I have defined as
public commitment to democracy and populism. For the purposes of this paper, public
commitment to democracy will be expressed only as commitment to democracy, and lack
of institutional commitment to democracy will be understood only as illiberal democracy.
This is an important distinction and provides the foundation for this theoretical approach.
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2019/iss1/11
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6.

Theoretical Expectation
The Czech Republic and Hungary are remarkably similar in many ways, which is
why they are very good case studies for this project. However, as was previously mentioned,
Hungary has a higher democracy score. For this reason, I am anticipating that Hungary is
more illiberal and as such has a lower commitment to democracy, and a higher populism
score. If this is the case, then these metaphorical polymorphisms may have allowed Hungary
to survive but have also left their dedication to liberalism in question. Regardless, the same
could be true of the Czech Republic. This variance in levels of populism and commitment
to democracy provides the framework for an evolutionary approach to politics. Depending
on which variable is strongest in each country, we can make tentative conclusions about the
way democracies form using such a model.
7. Findings
7.1. The situation in the Czech Republic.
At the height of the 2008 financial crisis when markets plummeted across the
globe, many countries turned to strong leaders that took on classically populist rhetoric in
order to confront the economic issues that were plaguing their country. The Czech Republic was no exception. In 2009 Mirek Topolanek was appointed to the position of prime
minister, and the same year, their democracy score jumped from 2.25 to 3. On an ordinal
scale from 1 to 7 (1=Most Democratic, 7=Least Democratic), this means that the Czech
Republic’s institutions became significantly less liberal as their score increased. Perhaps this
loss in democratic values can be accounted for by populism and commitment to democracy
as characteristics that allowed for survival but forced change in an illiberal direction.
According the Hawkins’ populist measurement, Mirek Topolanek received an average score of 1 for the four years he was in office. This suggests that he sits in between
what the research calls ‘somewhat populist’ and ‘populist’. For comparison purposes, Hugo
Chavez received nearly a 2 on the same scale, which would suggest that he is ‘very populist’.
Although Prime Minister Topolanek never reached the same level of populism as Chavez,
his score hovered around 1 during his term, which indicates an important populist shift that
took place in the years directly following the financial crisis.
These changes did not affect the Czech Republic’s commitment to democracy.
In 2009, Pew Research Center conducted a survey with the intent to understand attitudes
about democracy in various countries in Central and Eastern Europe. They found that 81%
of Czechs felt that a democratic government was better suited to solve the problems their
country was facing than a strong leader. Furthermore, roughly six-in-ten Czechs (61%)
agreed with the statement that “voting gives people like me some say about how the government runs things.” Indeed, enthusiasm for the liberally democratic direction politics have
taken since 1989 is widespread in the Czech Republic (Pew Research, 2010). A country report published by BTI in 2008 illustrates a similar trend; according to their research, “Most
citizens support democratic institutions and no important groups seek to change the Czech
political system” (BTI 2008). These findings are summarized in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Commitment to Democracy in Czech Republic

Given the rise in democracy scores at the onset of the economic crisis, it is particularly intriguing that the Czech Republic’s commitment to democracy did not falter, yet
their institutions appeared to become less liberal. Perhaps in the Czech Republic, commitment to democracy was a characteristic that allowed for regime survival, but unlike populism, did not contribute change in an illiberal direction during the years directly following
the 2008 financial crisis. To sum it up, Czechia’s commitment to democracy remained
strong despite economic and political turbulence that may have suggested otherwise. However, recent political changes seem to be shifting the conversation.
The election of President Zeman and appointment of Andrej Babis to the office
of Prime Minister have taken the country in an unprecedented illiberal direction. While
Hawkins’ team of experts has not yet compiled a populism score for either of these leaders,
it is clear that they have incited change within the Czech Republic. Babis’ party, ANO,
stands for “Action of Dissatisfied Citizens,” which rings of populist rhetoric. Similarly, he
has positioned himself as an anti-politics politician, frequently criticizing older, established
parties for alleged corruption and ineptitude while basing his support on a “people’s platform” (Smith, 2017). According to BTI, the Czech Republic’s commitment to democracy
is on the decline (BTI, 2018). This is perplexing because it suggests that commitment to
democracy today is weaker than it was 8 years ago at the height of the economic crisis.
Perhaps the Czech Republic is being subject to new selective pressures and polymorphisms,
which are leading to this change.
7.2. The situation in Hungary.
Just as the Czech Republic turned to Mirek Topolanek, Hungary turned to Viktor
Orbán. Using populist rhetoric has his ally, Viktor Orbán declared in 2014 that “democracy
is not necessarily liberal” (Tóth, 2014). Hungary would be ushering in a new era of illibhttps://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2019/iss1/11

Claremont–UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union

143

eralism with Viktor Orbán at the forefront. While to some these statements may come as a
surprise, the reality lies more within the bounds of evolution.
On Hawkins’ populist scale, Viktor Orbán received close to a 1 during both of his
terms as Prime Minister. Like Topolanek, this places him in between ‘somewhat populist’
and ‘populist’. As such, the Czech Republic and Hungary are very similar in this way. Both
countries responded to crisis with populism as a means of maintaining survival. However,
it is clear that Hungary is far more illiberal, even to the extent that they identify as such.
Orbán’s rhetoric responds particularly to immigration and EU policy as issues of sovereignty
while also cultivating a close relationship with Russia (Hawkins et al., 2012). These findings
are summarized in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Populism in the Czech Republic and Hungary

In light of this, it is no surprise that Hungary’s commitment to democracy is significantly lower than that of the Czech Republic. According to another study conducted by
Pew Research, 53% of the population in Hungary is unsatisfied with democracy. Similarly,
only 18% of citizens in Hungary are committed to democratic institutions. In comparison,
60% are not committed and more than 15% prefer undemocratic governments (Wike et al.
2017). This means that there is almost an equal number of people who are committed to
democracy as there are people who prefer undemocratic alternatives. Furthermore, of all the
countries in the study, Hungary was the most financially stable with the least commitment
to democracy. Its economic counterparts include the likes of South Korea, Canada, and
Australia. Yet Hungary’s commitment to democracy remains consistently lower.
This comes as no surprise given the popularity of Viktor Orbán and Fidesz with
the people of Hungary. Like the ugly (or at least different) duckling, Hungary is revealing
itself to be ‘genetically’ different. Just as the mother duck mistakenly perceived each one
The Finch Effect
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of her ducklings to be the same, perhaps the EU has made a similar error with Hungary:
oblivious to its inherent dissimilarity until now. In any case, populism and commitment to
democracy appear to be characteristics that have resulted in survival but have also contributed to an illiberal change. These two things help explain why Hungary’s democracy score
might be higher than the Czech Republic’s. These findings are summarized in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Commitment to Democracy in Hungary

8.

What does this mean in the context of evolution?
Where populism appears to be consistent in both countries, Hungary’s commitment to democracy is strikingly lower than that of Czechia. Though it is clear that the
degree of illiberalism is different in these two countries, these measures provide a new explanation.
Just as the bird with a small beak was selected out of the environment on a certain
island, liberal democracy was selected out of the environment in Hungary. The findings
indicate that this could be because of two things: populism and commitment to democracy.
Additionally, just as climate change effected the food source of the birds, the 2008 financial crisis threatened the stability of the country. According to an article published by The
Guardian, “Hungary was the hardest hit of the central European EU members because so
much of its massive government debt was foreign-owned. These foreigners wanted to sell
their Hungarian forint-denominated bonds, but no new buyers appeared on the market”
(Darvas, 2008). As a result, the economic and political legitimacy of the government was
called into question and the future of the regime at the time was uncertain. It is no surprise
that only two years later Viktor Orbán was appointed as Prime Minister. Like the beak of
the bird, populism and commitment to democracy allowed for Hungary to survive despite
that detrimental pressure. Unfortunately, these characteristics also contributed to the resurgence of illiberal democracy as a residual effect.
If this is the case, why hasn’t illiberal democracy disappeared now that Hungary’s
economy is thriving? In this context, it might be because commitment to democracy is a
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2019/iss1/11
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polymorphism that is not just a result of external pressure like populism is, but also an innate
aspect of Hungary’s political climate. Just as the ugly duckling was not a duckling to begin
with, neither was Hungary ever truly liberal. The type of democracy we see in that country
today is a result of this and other metaphorical polymorphisms that arise as a consequence of
certain selective pressures.
Comparatively, the Czech Republic has not been affected the same way but is
noticeably slipping into illiberal habits (Hanley & Vachudova, 2018). Although Mirek Topolanek’s populism score is fairly high, the country is still committed to democracy, though
that is noticeably decreasing following Andrej Babis and his political front known as ANO
(Action of Dissatisfied Citizens). This might suggest that commitment to democracy is not
a polymorphism that the Czech Republic possesses. Perhaps the Czech Republic is not an
ugly duckling but is actually innately liberal in ways that Hungary is not. In this respect, it
is likely a characteristic that contributes to survival, but in a liberal manner rather than an
illiberal one. Nonetheless, while Czechia may genetically be a duck, they are certainly getting uglier. With the government in the hands of Zeman and Babis, liberal democracy in
the Czech Republic is taking a turn for the worse.
On the other hand, populism is a characteristic that contributes to the survival of
the Czech Republic in an illiberal manner. Mirek Topolanek, Milos Zeman, and Andrej
Babis are leaders that have changed the political climate of the Czech Republic in significantly populist and arguably illiberal ways. After the 2008 financial crisis, like many other
countries, Czechia turned to strong populist leaders in order to maintain control. But in the
process of doing so, it has become undoubtedly less liberal. Perhaps a similar procedure is
taking place today with Zeman and Babis as a result of immigration or other selective pressures.
If we were to approach these findings in the same way as Modelski and Thompson (1999), we might attribute the resurgence of illiberal democracy as the resulting global
authority to various macro-level events like the 2008 financial crisis. However, not all
countries have become illiberal, and it is becoming increasingly more evident that not all
countries are on a path to become liberal. In a global world the answer lies not in “survival of
the fittest” but in variation. These findings demonstrate that fact and describe the immense
variation we observe. In both the case of Hungary and the case of the Czech Republic, an
evolutionary model fits the direction that both countries have gone. If this is the case of two
countries that are remarkably similar, it might be even more true of countries that are vastly
different. Further investigation is warranted.
9.

Epistemological Concerns
Evolutionary theories inherently suggest that behavior of any sort is a product of
environmental and genetic factors rather than agentic based decisions. As such, this approach
could be interpreted as not only reductionistic, but also deterministic. These are dangerous
assumptions. Political actors and the choices they make are imperative to any political system. These choices can be made by interest groups, voters, members of the legislature, and
even executive authorities. In all cases, the decisions they make produce different outcomes.
In Hungary, voters could have chosen not to elect Fidesz as the majority party in parliament
(but they did). Parliament could have chosen not to appoint Viktor Orbán as Prime Minister
(but it did). Viktor Orbán could have chosen not to lead Hungary in an illiberal direction
(but he did). Indeed, in another world, Hungary might have been the Germany of Central
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and Eastern Europe. Certainly, the EU wishes it were so.
Choices are significant to say the least, but why do people make the choices that
they do? To say that people are free to choose as they wish is equally as wrong as saying that
the future is determined by evolution. Both the EU and Fukuyama made the same mistake;
choice exists but is limited by circumstance –– circumstances that may be classified as both
selective pressures and polymorphisms. In essence, just as ducks can never be swans, some
democracies may never be liberal. The choices that they make are predicated on this genetic
disposition and the external forces that place stress on a certain regime.
10. Conclusion
At the onset of the 21st century it seemed like Fukuyama was correct, that the
end of history really was liberal. But that was before 9/11, before the 2008 Financial Crisis,
before EU Enlargement, before the refugee crisis, and before the election of leaders like
Donald Trump to heads of state across the world. The truth is that we can’t predict the
future, but we can experiment with suggestive analogies that help us think about the future
in the context of the past and the present. What this paper demonstrates is the viability of
a new approach to understanding the resurgence of illiberal democracies across the world
using biological evolution as a model.
Populism and commitment to democracy are just two things that might explain
why the Czech Republic and Hungary are experiencing the democratic shift that they
are. Though many countries across Central and Eastern Europe share similar origins, their
implementation—or lack of—liberal democracy is by no means the same. The key to answering the age-old question, why?, lies in the concept, presented in this paper, of evolution. Liberal democracy has, in the case of Hungary, been selected out of the environment
as a result of the country’s waning commitment to democracy and increased presence of
populism. This differs from the Czech Republic, which has also adopted populist ideologies while maintaining a higher level of commitment to democracy. The explanation for
variation in liberal democracy for these two countries lies in the conflicting commitment to
democracy that each country has.
This analogy takes the form of a finch, but just as the physical world is filled with
different species of birds and animals, so is the political world filled with different regimes
and democracies. To recall a quote from David Ritchie, “The phrase ‘survival of the fittest’
is very apt to mislead for it suggests the fittest or best in every sense, whereas in reality it
only means the survival of those best fitted to cope with their circumstances” (Ritchie 1891,
12). The democracies in the Czech Republic and Hungary have adapted and made choices
based on their circumstances, and as a result have evolved in an illiberal manner. The same
can be said of countries everywhere. We must understand this in order to make sense of the
future, but in no way can we ever predict it.
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